From Black Power to Black Studies

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

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CHAPTER THREE

Revolution at San Francisco State College

The Third World Strike of 1968–1969 stands out as one of the most memorable moments in American educational history. From November 1968 to March 1969, a dedicated and well-organized student insurgency waged a bitter and protracted fight against the San Francisco State College administration. Student activists staged massive rallies, clashed with police, shut down the campus, and engaged in lengthy negotiations with administrators. Not only did the strike result in the creation of a new academic discipline, black studies, but it was also a pivotal event in California history. Politicians such as Ronald Reagan, Jesse Unruh, S. I. Hayakawa, Willie Brown, and Ron Dellums all used the strike as an opportunity to launch or further their careers. Among student strikes, the Third World Strike at San Francisco State College equals or surpasses most others in its length, intensity, and repercussions.

The Third World Strike raises important historical and sociological questions. Historically, it shows how nationalist politics arrived on college campuses, resulting in black studies. The story of how Black Panther party members targeted the campus for mobilization shows how broader trends in black politics penetrated a college and destabilized its administration. The strike's history reveals how campus activists transformed the black student association into an effective political unit. In this heady atmosphere, black students created a college curriculum focused on black topics. The genealogy of black studies offered in this chapter traces the connections between broader trends in black politics and the birth of a new academic discipline.

Sociologically, the Third World Strike shows how movements develop inside organizations and how bureaucracies respond to challengers. Mobilized black students used San Francisco State College's resources to create the prototype black studies program in 1967, which was formally established as a degree-granting program in the fall of 1969. The creation of black studies shows how movement participants inside a bureaucracy use the organization's own resources as a tool for developing institutional alternatives.

The strike is also interesting because while at first the school's administration was thrown into disarray, the college president managed to end the strike and reclaim a substantial amount of control over the campus. This chapter seeks to understand how San Francisco State College's administration responded to student revolt and the implications for how sociologists should analyze interactions between movements and organizations. By comparing the actions of San Francisco State College presidents who responded to the Third World Strike and other disruptions, I show how college president S. I. Hayakawa ended the strike by subtly using his persona to manage critics, while developing stricter disciplinary policies and appointing loyalists within the administration. These actions, I argue, effectively countered the students' ability to delegitimize the college presidency, which eventually allowed Hayakawa to prevail in the conflict.

In addressing both the emergence of nationalism on campus and the administration's response to turmoil, this chapter presents a detailed narrative addressing the origins of black studies and how S. I. Hayakawa's actions undermined the coalition staging the strike. The chapter begins with an account of the Third World Strike's institutional context. After briefly recounting San Francisco State College's history and the politics of the California state college system, I describe the events culminating in the demand for black studies and the ensuing strike. The discussion addresses the arrival of Black Panther activists, the student-created institutions that acted as incubators, the first black studies courses, and how black student protest eroded the authority of administrators at San Francisco and other California colleges.

The chapter's middle sections describe the chain of events leading to the Third World Strike: conflicts between black and white students, the innovation of the black studies idea, and the expulsion of Black Panther George Murray from the campus. Attention is paid to the infamous "*Gater* incident," a fight between black students and the student newspaper's editor. The event itself was brief: black students, led by Black Panther and undergraduate George Murray, initiated a fistfight with the newspaper staff. Although the altercation

lasted just a few minutes, it triggered a series of events that culminated in the Third World Strike.

The remainder of the chapter shows how these currents converged in a perfect storm of student revolt, administrative impotency, and massive external political pressures. The extreme stress of state politics and sustained student agitation left the administration unable to cope with revolting black student groups. The strain was so great that the president resigned during the strike, leaving the campus adrift during a highly volatile time. Surprisingly, by March 1969, the unpopular acting president, S. I. Hayakawa, persuaded the student coalition to accept amnesty in return for officially terminating the strike. I focus on how Hayakawa's bureaucratic maneuvering allowed him to accomplish this feat.

This chapter's concluding section discusses the strike's implications for the analysis of movement-bureaucracy interactions. The Third World Strike's outcome suggests that researchers need a better account of what administrators with limited powers, such as college presidents, can do in response to an insurgency. It is not enough to observe that revolts occur when bureaucracies face external pressures and internal challenges or when workers within the organizations forge contacts with movements outside the organization.[1] Crises like the Third World Strike show that administrators can have a dramatic impact on how conflict plays out. An administrator's manipulation of organizational and personal resources, such as his or her reputation, can be important factors in how conflicts conclude. Leaders employ the available resources and strategies to cope with problems and alter the terms of conflict. An organization's leader can exploit its relations with the public, rewrite policies, and cultivate loyalists who will implement the leadership's edicts. Hayakawa's unusual ability to use his "tough love" persona as a resource in the strike is a remarkable example of how a skillful social actor can convert his public image into a strong position. Hayakawa's acquisition of power through image management and bureaucratic manipulation suggests that any account of how movements extract concessions from organizations must include a description of how leaders exploit their bureaucratic environment.[2]

The Setting: The California State College System

San Francisco State College, at first glance, might not seem like the kind of school that would experience a cataclysmic struggle between students and ad-

ministrators. Until the 1950s, the college was known for its adult education and vocational programs. In the late 1800s, San Francisco State College was created from the San Francisco Normal School, an all-female teacher training college, when the Normal School faculty split because some teachers wished to avoid the city's corrupting influence. One school relocated to San Jose and eventually became San Jose State University. The institution left behind became San Francisco State College. In the early twentieth century, San Francisco State College allowed men to enroll and, with the assistance of the state legislature, expanded to offer liberal arts degrees and other professional degrees.[3]

The college's modern incarnation began in the 1950s, when it moved to its current location near Lake Merced in San Francisco. After the war, the coeducational school became the home of highly regarded graduate programs such as its music program, where jazz saxophonist John Handy worked, and a writing program employing prominent novelists such as Kay Boyle. The college in the 1950s was sometimes described as a sort of educational ideal because it attracted eager adult students from a sophisticated city. As historian Alex Chandler notes, few would have expected the laid-back, hip college of the '50s to emerge as the vanguard of the '60s.[4] In fact, it was this liberal atmosphere that would act as a hothouse for student movements in the 1960s.

The other important event that changed San Francisco State College was the school's 1961 incorporation into the reorganized California state college system, which triggered a lengthy series of confrontations between the college and the state of California.[5] A system parallel to the University of California, the California state college system was designed to serve a wider range of students than the University of California.[6] In the 1960s, the California state college system comprised eighteen colleges providing teacher training and a basic liberal arts curriculum to the bulk of California's college-eligible population. Unlike the University of California, the California state colleges were not research oriented. Instead, they had a clearly defined teaching mission. San Francisco State College, for example, became known for adult education.

The political organization of California's higher education system created tensions because the state colleges were relegated to secondary status and were never able to acquire the best state resources, which created resentment. This problem was exacerbated by the colleges' inability to adequately pay faculty members. Throughout the 1960s, the San Francisco State College administration fought with professorial groups over salaries. For the most part, these conflicts were never resolved. At one point, they were intensified by the state

legislature. In 1965, a budgeting error by the legislature resulted in an unexpected 1.8 percent pay cut for the faculty.[7] The legislature could not find the money to compensate for this oversight, and the faculty went on strike. Open conflicts between the university and the faculty continued until early 1969.

The bureaucratic structure of the California state college system made it difficult to resolve problems such as the unexpected faculty salary cut. The key issue was that the California master plan had placed ultimate authority for policies and budgets in the hands of the legislature, with the chancellor being the intermediary between the colleges and the state assembly.[8] The purpose was to eliminate an older system of oversight that allowed each college to lobby for funds. Instead, the chancellor's office would sift through proposals and negotiate with the legislature. This structure proved inflexible because the California college system was governed by a small, centralized chancellor's office. For a system of twenty-three colleges in a more than $200 million budget, the office had 215 staff members. A common observation was that the chancellor's office was unable to quickly respond to proposals and resolve disputes at the individual campuses. Many administrators and legislators throughout the 1960s proposed giving the California colleges more autonomy. An unnamed administrator in 1969 said that these proposals were "just 'political games'" and that autonomy would require a serious reconsideration of the California master plan. Most proposals for more flexibility were never seriously considered.[9]

The California state college system's problems went far beyond inflexible and slow policy making. The three-tiered higher education system encouraged a sense of inferiority with respect to the University of California, leading to resentment among California college employees. There was always the feeling that the legislature valued the University of California over the California state colleges. In the words of one administrator, "There is an Avis (as in 'we're number two') paranoia which permeates the state college system." According to one observer, even the trustees of the college system felt as if they were "number two." Unlike the University of California trustees, the state college trustee position was not enshrined in the California state constitution; it was a legislative act. The board of trustees could be abolished at any time.[10]

Like the administration, the faculty felt stressed. The largest problems were the heavy teaching load and the limited graduate offerings. As with faculties at most state colleges, there were many efforts to reduce the workload and increase time for research. The lack of graduate courses and the heavy teaching load were interpreted as signs of low status. In surveys of scholars rejecting

offers from California colleges, the most commonly cited reasons were low pay, high teaching load, and lack of Ph.D. programs. College system administrators also believed that the increase in faculty turnover from 8.8 percent in the 1963 academic year to 10.6 percent by the end of 1967 was attributable to low pay and a heavy workload.[11]

In addition to the tensions stemming from faculty salaries and relations with the board of trustees, the San Francisco State College campus was in a constant state of disruption starting in the mid-1960s. The conflicts are too numerous to completely list here, but a few are worth mentioning. As they did at many campuses, students demonstrated for civil rights and against the Vietnam War. On any given day, there were at least one or two rallies, and they routinely became violent. In the 1967–1968 academic year, there were student sit-ins at the administration building and fights with the police over ROTC recruiters.[12] In addition to these politically motivated protests, students fought with administrators over campus-specific issues. For example, in 1968, administrators clashed with students over the design for the student union building.[13] There were also staff strikes. Campus deans spent much of the 1967–1968 school year arguing with librarians and the custodial staff over pay and unionization, which disrupted the college's daily routines.[14]

Never-ending struggles took their toll on college administrators. While data on administrator turnover is hard to obtain, it is worth noting that San Francisco State College had five presidents between 1960 and 1968. In the eight years before the Third World Strike, the college presidents each stayed for about a year. One president, Robert Smith, lasted only a few months and resigned as the Third World Strike was shaping up to be a major event. Smith's resignation was a response to the intense atmosphere in San Francisco in 1968. Governor Ronald Reagan was harshly criticizing both the University of California and the California state colleges, and no solution was in sight for the Third World Strike. Earlier college presidents did not fare much better. John Summerskill, president in the 1967–1968 academic year, abruptly resigned in February 1968. At the end of the spring semester, he took a trip to Ethiopia as a Ford Foundation consultant and did not return.[15] Moreover, problems were not limited to the college presidency. The system's chancellor, Glenn Dumke, who had been San Francisco State College's president, received a vote of no confidence from the statewide academic senate in May 1968.[16]

San Francisco State College may have started in the 1950s as an adult-oriented, urban college with a relaxed atmosphere. But its incorporation into the Cali-

fornia state college system changed this by introducing financial problems, conflicts with California state bureaucrats, and poor morale. The administrative weakness created by this situation meant that the deans and college president were unprepared for black student mobilization.

Black Panthers at San Francisco State College

The wave of student protests rippling throughout America created tension at the college. Like many campuses, San Francisco State College was in constant turmoil from the mid-1960s until the early 1970s. In that respect, it was like many other campuses swamped by protest, faculty disputes, and institutional stress. What was different, much different, was that its black student population was targeted by SNCC and Black Panther activists. During the two years preceding the Third World Strike, a handful of Black Panthers enrolled at San Francisco State College with the explicit goal of mobilizing black students to organize strikes.

Activists were confronted with a relatively small population of black students. According to some sources, only 4 percent of the students were black in the mid- to late 1960s. But despite their small numbers, black students were beginning to mobilize and develop the tools that would later be used during the push for black studies. Specifically, students in 1963 formally registered the Black Student Association, later named the Black Student Union (BSU), as an official student club.[17] The BSU was crucial because it catered to black students, provided a regular meeting place on campus, and reinforced bonds among members. Black students at San Francisco State College were not unique in their organizational efforts. A black student union was often the main vehicle for black political organization at predominantly white campuses. The black student movement of the late 1960s grew out of these campus clubs, a trend documented by historians of black politics.[18] This should not be surprising. A functioning black student union was a reliable channel of communication for black students and an opportunity to coordinate political actions.

Although the demographic and organizational elements for mobilization were present as early as 1963, it was not until 1966 that San Francisco State College black students radicalized and began to view the college itself as a deeply flawed and racist institution. The key event was the arrival of Jimmy Garrett, a Black Panther and SNCC member, who enrolled at San Francisco State College in order to mobilize black students. In a 1969 interview with the federal gov-

ernment's commission investigating the strike, Garrett explains how he came to the college:

> Q. *Can you tell me what your background was when you got here and what you found in the Negro Students association or whatever they called it at the time?*
> A. My background—I had been in SNCC for several years. . . . I ran the L.A. office for a year. I went to school in Los Angeles and in Texas. . . . The reason I came to campus was to try to do some organizing. I wasn't interested in going to school for any other reason than to organize the students.
>
> Q. *Were you invited there, Jimmy, for this purpose?*
> A. No. I knew some people who are living in San Francisco, didn't want to, couldn't organize in L.A., for instance, just couldn't—too far away, it was just too large, the place is too large, UCLA, Cal State. I had done two years at East Los Angeles College before I went to UCLA for a little while.[19]

Garrett talks about San Francisco State College's desirable traits. It was not too large; it was close to where he lived; and the college already had a black student organization. In his interview, Garrett remembers a 1965 Students for a Democratic Society meeting where he learned that the college had a substantial black student group. One of the largest black contingents at the meeting was from San Francisco State College. Garrett suspected that a strong black nationalist identity could be forged at San Francisco State College.

Garrett's arrival marked a new stage for black students at the college. For the first time, a charismatic person with years of experience in the civil rights movement tried to convert the black student club into a platform for revolutionary action. Specifically, he believed that students needed black consciousness. His experience with anti–civil rights violence in Mississippi persuaded him that an all-black political organization was necessary, and he was going to radicalize the San Francisco students. According to Garrett, the organized black student population was "one reason I went because I wanted to combat that kind of confusing notion that blacks and whites could be organized together. That failed in Mississippi, it failed all over."[20] Garrett arrived with the goal of promoting a nationalist identity for the existing black student club. He wanted a black group pushing for black goals:

> Q. *You were convinced of this need for separate groups even before you got there. You didn't arrive at the decision after you got there.*

> A. I knew I had to organize Black students around issues that are close to them. Separate issues that you have to organize around, cultural things as well as political things. Two separate cultures.[21]

Garrett immediately set out to accomplish his task. He surveyed the black student scene and concluded that there were a lot of "tendencies" among black students. In addition to cultural nationalists, he identified fraternity/sorority members, integrationists, "men who went out with white girls, girls who went with white men," and "students who were trying to be what white students are all around the country—just try to go to school and be a good white person."[22]

Garrett fostered a nationalist spirit by telling students to identify racism on campus: "I started pushing people on the issues . . . [and] they began to settle down to work projects, different kinds of projects, like how [to] cut out racism in different areas on campus. Finding out what classes were racist. What teachers were racists." At this point Garrett innovates what might be the embryonic form of black studies at San Francisco State College: "We began to set up, well we call it internal education program where we would [meet] at my house or someone else's house and we would talk about ourselves, seeking identity, and stuff like that. A lot of folks didn't even know they were black. A lot of people thought they were Americans. Didn't feel themselves that they were Black people. We discussed that a great deal."[23] Garrett's discussion group spent much time thinking about how the entire college might be racist. The group then discussed another issue that would be crucial for the organizational development of black studies: the need for an educational program that was relevant to urban black communities. "At the same time, people were saying it was real absurd that when they began to seek out things in the community which was not far, about four miles away from the school, they began to see things in the community, in the Fillmore area, Hunter's Point area, which made what we were learning irrelevant."[24]

Disillusionment with the standard college education motivated the creation of an off-campus program called the Tutorial Center. In the 1966 school year, the group opened an office where students operated academic support programs for children in poor San Francisco neighborhoods, such as Hunter's Point. The Tutorial Center affected black students in many ways. Running the center required dedication because it was located in a crime-ridden neighborhood. The Tutorial Center was also difficult to find because it was in an unmarked building; a state senator who prepared a report on the Third World

Strike wrote that finding the center posed a serious challenge, even when armed with the correct address.[25] The Tutorial Center program encouraged solidarity among students because they were working toward a common goal. Most important, the program allowed students to operate an educational institution on their own terms. In a real sense, it was the direct predecessor to black studies.

The BSU and the Tutorial Center increased student contact with the Black Panthers. The BSU office was only a block away from the local Black Panther office, where younger blacks with a "militant look—big, bushy Afro hairdos for men and women, black leather jackets for the men, boots for the women" would meet. The same observer noted that the BSU and Black Panther offices were located in a tough section of town where street violence was common. There were tables with Maoist propaganda outside the Panther and BSU offices.[26] Although contacts between the BSU and the Panthers were not formalized, there was frequent intermingling. San Francisco State College students attended Panther events, and Panthers "rapped" with college students.

While students developed the BSU into a militant group and started the Tutorial Center program, Garrett recruited other students for civil rights projects in the South. This experience provided students with political skills while also radicalizing them: "May of 1966 . . . that summer was spent taking people to the South. I took some people into the South. I took some people into Mississippi, Alabama and Georgia, to people I knew at SNCC to let them see what was happening . . . [and] it changed everybody who went down there. So we would send people down there to see what was happening in the South, to see what kind of system it was."[27] This was a common experience among student activists of the era and has been documented by other researchers.[28] Working in the South made black activists more willing to consider nationalist politics and philosophies. Travels to the South persuaded many activists that working with whites was a limited strategy. Instead, blacks should pursue their own goals.

The emergence of a nationalist movement on the San Francisco campus illustrates the convergence of nationalist politics and black students' organizational development. By 1966, black students at the college possessed all they would need for effective mobilization. The BSU itself was a functioning tool for gathering black students and coordinating their actions. The BSU elected a president with years of organizing experience, Jimmy Garrett, who provided an intellectual framework for seeing San Francisco State College as deeply flawed. Most important, black students understood that they could operate their own

education program, such as the Tutorial Center—an insight that would later encourage the creation of black studies.

Black Student Protest Rocks the California State College System

The black student mobilization at San Francisco was not an isolated event. The BSU was only one of a dozen or more active black student groups that were challenging public schools across the state. Students at other California colleges were staging demonstrations and fighting for their own causes, which had consequences for the events unfolding in San Francisco. As black protest spread throughout the public colleges, administrators found it increasingly difficult to respond to the problems presented at their own campuses. The system's central office often found it difficult to engage with students. To fully understand the strain experienced by the California state college system in the 1960s, one must appreciate that students were imposing serious costs on the educational system. Their actions required that administrators spend a great deal of time addressing black demonstrations in addition to all the events staged against the Vietnam War and other issues of the day. In many cases, ongoing black insurgency undermined the administration's ability to cope with their campus's daily operations. The mobilization at San Francisco coincided with black student protests at other campuses, which taxed the system's ability to respond to challengers. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the Third World Strike was the black student revolt that most fully achieved its potential as a crisis within the California colleges.

The severity of the black student revolt is apparent when one examines administrative reports filed in the late 1960s. According to California state college system documents, in the 1967–1968 school year, eleven of the eighteen California colleges experienced some form of black student activism. At some schools, black protest was relatively mild. In May 1968, for example, the Fresno State College Black Student Union made demands of President Ness. The students verbally harassed the president and broke all sorts of rules; for example, they uprooted parking lot trees, set small fires, and jumped into public fountains. The most symbolically potent of actions was painting classroom doors black, a literal sign of black power.[29]

At other campuses, like San Francisco State College, black student protest was taking on epic proportions. At the Los Angeles campus, California college

students organized a demonstration against the Dow Chemical Corporation, a popular target for campus protest because of its military contracts. Together with Students for a Democratic Society, the BSU led a demonstration against Dow's campus recruiters that resulted in seventeen arrests of students and faculty. Of those arrested, seven were convicted of various misdemeanors, and two students fled the country.[30] Other campuses experienced more protracted protest campaigns. Six campuses, like San Francisco State College, had BSUs determined to extract all sorts of concessions from the college administrators and the student government. It was not unusual for a campus's black student association to ally itself with other groups to stage massive demonstrations, which routinely required police intervention.

If black students were trying to challenge the administration's authority with a strategy of harassment and public demonstrations, then they were succeeding beyond expectation. Black student revolt tested the limits of the administration's power to control the campus. By the summer of 1968, the California college system office and various campus administrators were in a protracted and painful debate over exactly how students should be disciplined and what they could do about the protests. The problem was this: the California college campuses had developed very lenient policies toward student behavior. At institutions such as San Francisco State College, there had been simply no prior need for a strict discipline policy because college administrators viewed student activism as an off-campus issue, to be dealt with by the police.

At a time when students were doing all sorts of unpredictable things—ranging from the harmless (the love-in) to the dangerous (fights with the police)—the lack of a well-crafted discipline policy was a major problem that manifested itself in numerous ways. One sign of the problem was the California legislature's hurried revisions and emergency amendments to the state's statutes regarding student discipline in December 1967 and February 1968.[31] Legislators, to their dismay, found that California penal codes could not be used to punish student demonstrators.

Another problem was the existing discipline code within the California colleges. The San Francisco State College code was not suited to quickly handling the problems associated with a well-organized student movement intent on creating disorder. For example, the San Francisco State College code, written in 1962 and not revised until the beginning of the Third World Strike in the fall of 1968, was based on a court of student jurors appointed by the president of the student government and two faculty members appointed by the college presi-

dent.[32] Aside from the problems associated with putting students in charge of discipline, the main difficulty was that the student government president from fall 1967 to spring 1969 was the founder of the Experimental College, Jim Nixon. As the director of a unit offering courses on guerilla war and black nationalism, Nixon was not the sort of person to quickly and efficiently deal with disruptions arising from protest. In addition to conflict-of-interest issues, disciplinary procedures were slow. There were many opportunities to appeal decisions and circumvent the system by claiming that another campus entity had jurisdiction over the issue. These problems were quite apparent by fall 1968. In the middle of the Third World Strike, San Francisco State's acting president instituted emergency powers, which gave the president and deans more direct power to suspend, expel, and discipline students. Unsurprisingly, these rules were resisted by student allies in the college's academic senate.[33]

Whatever the merits of the discipline code, it created an enormous political problem for the California colleges. Across the country, politicians and the media assailed college administrators for their inability to control their campuses. The California college system was the epitome of this problem. Throughout the mid-1960s, conservative politicians in California used campus unrest as a grandstanding opportunity. Student discipline problems created an opportunity for legislators and the governor to intervene in the California college system.[34]

Politicians personally blasted the California college presidents and their assistants. The most infamous example of this was when the board of trustees met in the fall of 1967 to hold a hearing on campus problems. College system leaders excoriated college president John Summerskill. Democratic and Republican legislative leaders and the entire board of trustees, including Governor Ronald Reagan, were present. Although the board "cleared" Summerskill of any "wrongdoing," observers called the meeting a public humiliation.[35] In February 1968, Summerskill quit, saying in his resignation that the Reagan administration had engaged in political interference and was "financially starving" the college.[36]

California politicians carried out their attacks on the colleges in the press. The most prominent was Ronald Reagan, who was a well-known critic of hippies and student protesters. But assailing the California colleges was not limited to Republicans. Democratic state assembly leader Jesse Unruh scored political points by trashing Summerskill and the California college administration. At a Sacramento press conference, Unruh stated that "the situation has become

totally intolerable. It not only threatens the lives and properties of our state colleges and university students but it also threatens the existence of our very important higher education. . . . I am inclined to believe that President Summerskill ought to be fired."[37]

The California state colleges were being disrupted on two levels. At a mundane level, student protest—often black student protest—interrupted the daily workings of the colleges. There were class disruptions, arrests, and demonstrations. These actions had the unintended consequence of showing that the college's administrators were unable to effectively wield authority and control unrest, which invited interference from state political elites. Protest showed that the colleges were unable to accomplish their basic educational and disciplinary functions. College administrators lost their legitimacy in the wider California political system and suffered accordingly.

The Experimental College and the Birth of Black Studies

By themselves, grievance and mobilization do not automatically lead to new organizational forms, such as a Department of Black Studies. It was one thing to say the college was racist; it was quite another to demand an entirely new curriculum. To generate an alternative to the existing curriculum, black students needed a place where they could experiment with alternatives and develop proposals. The missing link in this story is the Experimental College, an academic unit at San Francisco State College that allowed students to teach their own courses. The Experimental College permitted students to convert informal "rap sessions" into formal courses and then bundle black-themed courses together into a package called "black studies."

The Experimental College's role in the evolution of black studies shows how an organization internally generates change by offering a space where movement participants creatively refashion existing institutional practices. The rest of this section describes the Experimental College concept, how it grew from the administration's lenient attitudes, and how black students used the Experimental College to formulate the first complete black studies curriculum.

The Experimental College was itself part of a broader trend in the 1960s, when universities engaged in a wide range of curricular experiments. One aspect of this larger wave of experimentation was the idea that students should have some say in which courses are taught in the university.[38] Few colleges considered complete student control over courses, as is done at Deep Springs Col-

lege, but many university administrators believed that students could have a role in identifying topics not covered by traditional departmental offerings.[39] The venue for this would be the Experimental College, a distinct unit within the university. Students would teach their own courses on current events and nontraditional topics with relatively little supervision. At some universities, the Experimental College acted as a laboratory for testing new courses. Consistently large enrollments were viewed as indicators that a course deserved to be incorporated into an existing department. At San Francisco State College, it was not unusual for popular student-run courses on proper academic topics to be integrated into an existing department.

The origins of the Experimental College on the San Francisco State College campus go back to the early 1960s, when various San Francisco State College presidents implemented lenient student-behavior policies and allowed students to control a few campus activities. These lenient student policies began in 1960, when San Francisco State students were arrested in an anti-HUAC demonstration. Faced with a choice of disciplining students or letting them deal with the consequences of their actions in civil courts, the San Francisco State administration opted for the latter. Administrators also resisted the recommendations of faculty members who wanted to help protesters. In the words of one administrator, "We decided early that we could not accede to the pressures from the outside to punish students nor to the pressures from some of the faculty to help them. . . . We concluded that you can't enforce conduct off campus. It's administratively inconceivable because you can't do it. It's a problem for the courts." Smith then noted that "a kid has a right to go out and do something very great or very jackass."[40]

The lenient student-discipline policy soon evolved into giving students more power over campus events. Soon after the decision to be neutral with respect to the anti-HUAC protesters, the administration decided to let students choose and manage their own campus speakers. Before this decision, the administration paid for campus speakers and dictated what they could speak about. The administration then handed over most of the authority for organizing campus speakers to the student government. Another motive for liberalizing visiting-speaker rules was social control. Administrators felt that the more they tried to control campus speakers, the more students resisted them. The result was a new college policy that allowed students to invite any speaker they wanted to campus. The administration also eliminated most of the paperwork needed to bring speakers to campus. Recognizing that students should be treated as adults, a

1961 directive abolished most bureaucratic obstacles to hosting a speaker and imposed few controls.[41]

The creation of the Experimental College was a logical outgrowth of lax student discipline and the new campus-speaker policy. It was a short step from letting students do what they wanted off campus, to letting them organize their own lectures, and then to letting them operate seminars on campus. In 1965, Cynthia and Jim Nixon, both San Francisco students, organized a seminar for incoming freshmen sponsored by the student government. The noncredit seminar soon proved popular, and other students asked for permission to teach their own courses. In fall 1966, four hundred students enrolled in twenty-three courses sponsored by the student government. These courses were eventually placed within the newly formed Experimental College.[42]

The college's stated goal was to allow students to define their own education. In the ferment of 1960s San Francisco, the Experimental College served this function and many more. The Experimental College taught just about every kind of college course imaginable. Some courses were serious attempts at investigating current events. Others covered academic topics such as courses on American history, ballet instruction, and how to be a professional sculptor. Yet other courses indulged in pedagogical charlatanry. There was a course titled "Utopian Metaphysics of the Three-fold Forces" whose description was this: "The seminar is an In-Process application of the three-fold forces in nature: Earth, Man and God as the fundamental triad in the physics, metaphysics, and mystique of utopianism." A local church had its weekly service listed as a course. One course was cryptically listed as "spherical consciousness"; students were expected to engage in "W.I.S.D.O.M.," and the prerequisite was love.[43]

Not surprisingly, the Experimental College had its detractors, not only because of its unorthodox course offerings but also because of its leadership. Jim and Cynthia Nixon used student government money to pay for the costs of running the college. When Jim Nixon won the presidency of the student government on a pro–Experimental College platform, he moved $30,000 from the student government coffer to the Experimental College. This paid for room rentals as well as instructor salaries. Some California politicians seized on the college's weirdness and its sloppy accounting practices. State college administrators alleged that Nixon had put himself and some relatives on the payroll, sometimes twice. College administrators found that most students received $200 for teaching a semester course. The largest salaries were given to well-known

writers—such as literary critic Paul Goodman, who received $7,000 for teaching seminars and being the Experimental College's writer in residence.[44]

The freewheeling atmosphere attracted radicalized black students. One such student was Robert Coleman. A civil rights activist and former marine, he organized a course called "The Negro in America." The course was logically divided along a number of historical periods and covered the origins of the black power movement. He also assigned novels such as *Huckleberry Finn* and *Native Son.* Coleman taught the class in a militant style, as the following quote from a classroom exchange shows: "Rage, when it is internalized and can't let go, is a very cancerous growth. The American Negro is sick. This sickness is starting to bug me." A visitor to Coleman's class said that if the civil rights movement ever came to violence, the intelligent and militant Coleman would man the barricades.[45]

Coleman was not the only black student to take advantage of the Experimental College. BSU members used the college as an opportunity to develop their ideas and test the concepts that would become the first black studies curriculum. Jimmy Garrett explains this move:

> Q. *What about the experimental college? Was this another avenue of—*
> A. That we developed a Black Studies program? . . . So we decided—although this program was not called Black Studies, it was called—it was just part of the E. C. black courses, or black-oriented courses. So my [idea] was at that time to develop this. I wrote a proposal. . . . We had to go through the instructional policies committee and a lot of other committees which is one reason why instead of going to committees now black people on that campus move in a more fundamental basis, because we went through a year of committees.[46]

When asked if the black students were trying to build a permanent component of the Experimental College, Garrett responded:

> A. We wanted to build it into the institution of the College; we wanted to fit in with the institution. That is, that's the only way we thought it could live at the time.
>
> Q. *Did you from the start have the idea of a separate department?*
> A. No. We wanted some courses. We didn't—our thinking wasn't that advanced. And it was only through the process of being rejected consistently that SNCC studies, or colored studies, or negro studies . . . we didn't have these names . . . so

> over a period of time we began to develop our own and that was a cultural and political program of Black Studies.[47]

Black students created their own curriculum within the Experimental College. In 1966, students organized the "Black Arts and Culture Series." Students also taught a course in "black nationalism." In 1967, eleven courses on black history, politics, and culture were offered, and by 1968, the black studies curriculum covered history, social sciences, and the humanities.[48]

The black studies pamphlet issued by the Experimental College indicated its nationalist roots. Its cover displayed the famed Black Panther drawn by Emory

Figure 3.1. Jimmy Garrett was a Bay Area activist who enrolled at San Francisco State College so he could mobilize black students. He organized "rap sessions" where participants talked about racism and the first black studies courses in the Experimental College. Courtesy of *San Francisco Chronicle.*



Figure 3.2. In 1968, the Experimental College offered an entire black studies curriculum that included writing, social studies, literature, art, music, and history. The catalog cover image is one of the Black Panther Party logos designed by Emory Douglas. Courtesy of Special Collections/Archives, J. Paul Leonard Library, San Francisco State University.

Douglas. It also contained all the courses for a complete major in black studies. Social science courses included "Sociology of Black Oppression," "American Institutions," and "Culture in Cities." The black studies curriculum offered three semesters of composition taught by George Murray. Humanities courses included "Modern African Thought and Literature," "Recurrent Themes in Twentieth Century Afroamerican Thought," and creative writing. There were also two psychology courses on group interactions and a few on the arts, such as avant-garde jazz, play writing, and "black improvisation."[49]

What is most notable about the emergence of this curriculum is its dependence on so many other elements of the university. The ability to collect so many courses in one teaching unit was made possible by the Experimental College. Furthermore, the curriculum integrated nationalist ideas into the traditional academic structure. It addressed topics such as nationalism, black power,

and third world politics but did so by reference to ideas in fields like history, sociology, and political science. The inclusion of both social science and humanities courses shows that students mimicked the San Francisco State College curriculum in its diversity of represented disciplines. The black studies curriculum also emulated the tendency of many humanities departments to offer a writing sequence as a prerequisite for more advanced courses. By consciously connecting black studies to the traditional division of labor within the university, black students made it possible for black studies to become accepted in the academy.[50]

The *Gater* Incident

The event leading to the Third World Strike and the establishment of the first Department of Black Studies was the "*Gater* incident" of November 1967. Amid all the conflicts among various student groups, college employees, and the administration, tensions were heating up between the BSU and the white students working for the student newspaper, the *Daily Gater.* One dispute culminated in a fight between black student leaders and the *Daily Gater* editors. The fight's repercussions would result in the collapse of a college presidency and the birth of an academic discipline.

Throughout the 1967–1968 academic year, black students became much more visible as participants in the off-campus Tutorial Center program, the Experimental College, and various demonstrations. Black students also started pushing for control of various student government organizations. In the spring of 1967, BSU students ran for office but were defeated by a coalition of moderate and conservative student groups. There were fistfights between BSU members and other students. Tensions heightened when the student government cut funds for BSU-operated "action programs." In the fall of 1967, the BSU sponsored its own candidate for homecoming queen, and she lost the election. The election was then disputed in the student government.[51]

During both the student government and homecoming queen elections, the *Daily Gater* ran editorials criticizing black students. One article accused the BSU of being racist. The speaker of the student assembly, Pat Kimbley, said that the BSU was like "Hitler's far right, with the Black race as supreme." Another article reported that white students had visited California legislators to argue that the BSU was racist and that they should pressure the college to decertify the group. The *Gater* also published articles highlighting disputes between stu-

Figure 3.3. The *Gater* Incident. On November 6, 1967, a group of black students led by George Murray attacked the editors of the San Francisco student newspaper, the *Daily Gater*. Murray was suspended one year later and a coalition of student groups launched the Third World Strike to have him reinstated. The students also insisted that the Department of Black Studies be approved and opened. Courtesy of Bill Owen.

dent government representatives and the BSU.[52] By November 1967, tensions between the BSU and the *Gater* editors reached a boiling point. On the morning of November 6, 1967, a group of about ten black students arrived at the *Gater*'s editorial office and beat editor Jim Vaszko. The incident was photographed by other *Gater* staff members. Within minutes, the office was a mess, and the black students left.

The *Gater*'s next issue described the fight and showed the photographs. Black and white students could be seen wrestling and striking each other. The caption of one photo clearly identifies one of the assailants, BSU member and Black Panther George Murray: "Tutorial director George Murray (in the door) looks on as three persons jump instructor Lynn Ludlow and *Gater* photographer Mike Honey comes to Ludlow's aid." The article reports that some BSU members thought the homecoming queen election was rigged, an opinion voiced by at least one *Gater* staffer. Immediately, the San Francisco city police and the college administration began an investigation of the incident. President Summerskill—who was still working at the college—condemned the violence. The

Gater incident had immediate repercussions. At the very least, it aggravated black-white relations on campus. Jim Vaszko insisted that he would press criminal charges. A few days later, the *Gater* published a follow-up article asking for the student body's help in identifying some assailants who were still not known to the police.[53]

Publicity surrounding the *Gater* incident did not deter black students from staging confrontations and pushing their agenda. A few days after the fight, the homecoming queen election was invalidated. Ben Stewart, the current BSU president and a participant in the *Gater* attack, and twenty-five other black students appeared at a student government meeting. They found that there was a discrepancy in the vote count and the registration signature count that might have accounted for the slim margin of victory that put the non-BSU candidate ahead. The election was nullified. A spokesman for the BSU stood up, said, "We are satisfied," and then the entire black student entourage left the room.[54]

The following week, San Francisco city police issued warrants for the arrest of Ben Stewart, George Murray, and four other BSU members. A week after the *Gater* attack, these six individuals turned themselves in to the police after they acquired the assistance of state assemblyman and future mayor Willie Brown.[55] Acting as their attorney, Brown recommended they turn themselves in and face criminal proceedings. Their arrests were the beginning of two years of college disciplinary hearings and criminal trials. The administrative hearings, trials, and sentencing hearings relating to the *Gater* fight would continue for a year after the Third World Strike ended.

The *Gater* incident put Black Panther George Murray in the spotlight for the next two years and continued to focus attention on San Francisco State College. What was worse, in the eyes of California politicians, was that no one kept Murray away from campus. Although Murray was arrested in November 1967, he was soon released. Murray promptly returned to San Francisco State College as a student and continued to work with the BSU in the Tutorial Center. He even gained admission to the master's degree program in the Department of English.

For his opponents, Murray's appointment as a graduate student instructor was frustrating. Even though disciplinary hearings were in process and he was to be arraigned in a criminal court, Murray finished his undergraduate degree and was admitted to the graduate writing program in the English Department, which carried with it the opportunity to teach undergraduate courses. Although he was initially suspended by the English Department, a group of sym-

pathetic faculty members persuaded President Summerskill to reverse the decision.[56]

Critics were aghast. To make things worse, Murray spent the summer traveling to Cuba. Like many Panthers in the late 1960s, Murray found Cuba to be rather hospitable. Castro's regime was quite happy to welcome American dissidents. Cuba was also the host site of various international socialist student conferences, which Murray attended.

The rage against Murray exploded when he gave a fiery speech in Cuba against the American intervention in Vietnam, a speech that was reported in *Newsweek.* He derided American soldiers, offending many who heard about the speech.[57] When the American press reported that an American graduate student in Cuba so openly criticized American troops, outraged California residents directed their anger toward the governor's office, the board of trustees, and the college administration. Not surprisingly, state legislators and news columnists demanded to know why George Murray had not been suspended or expelled from the college. From their point of view, no student accused of beating another student, and who damned American soldiers while he was visiting a Communist country, should be allowed to teach in a state-funded educational institution.

Murray continued to agitate when he returned to the college in the fall of 1968. In an infamous speech on October 28, he stood on a cafeteria table and called for college students to carry guns to protect themselves from "racist administrators." This speech was reported by local newspapers, and the response was furious and immediate. Mayor Joseph Alioto asked the district attorney to see if the statements violated any laws. Since no one volunteered to testify that Murray was inciting others to carry guns, no charges were brought. President Robert Smith (Summerskill's successor) and Mayor Alioto met to discuss the issue and agreed that it should be handled carefully because Murray's suspension could lead to riots.[58]

Governor Reagan and state legislators pressured Smith to suspend George Murray. At first, the college president was reluctant. He wanted the school's disciplinary procedures to take their course, though he believed that Murray should be suspended. By September 1968 Smith had decided that Murray should be ejected from the campus. This strategy for handling Murray was a problem because the college's mechanisms for disciplining faculty and graduate instructors were underdeveloped and slow. As a graduate student instructor, Murray was not subject to immediate expulsion. Thus, the college's re-

sponse to Murray's beating of the *Gater* editor and subsequent indictment on assault charges dragged through the spring, summer, and fall of 1968. The pressure to suspend Murray grew intense. Although the board of trustees felt Smith was committed to removing Murray, the process simply was too slow. Eventually, Smith conceded to the governor and the board of trustees and suspended George Murray on October 31, 1968. Observers noted that the board's actions were unnecessary because Smith was already committed to expelling Murray. Rushing the process would only agitate things further.[59]

The Third World Strike Begins

Murray's suspension initiated one of the longest and most contentious episodes in the history of American higher education. The Third World Strike was a natural response to Smith's actions, given that all the elements for confrontation were present by the fall of 1968. The nationalist mobilization had reached San Francisco State College and converted black students into a well-organized force. By fall 1968, these students had developed a list of grievances motivating their actions. They felt that courses and student clubs didn't do enough to represent black interests. They believed that Murray had been unfairly treated. Some students thought that black studies in the Experimental College courses needed more prominence. Murray's suspension catapulted this volatile mixture of organized students, political demands, and administrative weakness into intense conflict.

Given these developments, it is not surprising that Murray's suspension triggered a prolonged crisis. When word reached Murray that he was suspended, his allies demanded his reinstatement. Students announced on October 31, 1968, that if Smith did not agree to bring Murray back, they would strike on November 6, the one-year anniversary of the *Gater* incident. Attempts to persuade President Robert Smith to bring Murray back went unheeded. Perhaps the students did not understand that President Smith was under much pressure to quickly expel Murray from the campus. They probably did not know that Smith was committed to Murray's eventual expulsion. On November 5, 1968, students arrived at Smith's office and issued a list of ten demands. If the demands were not immediately met, the Black Student Union and its allies would strike to shut down the campus. The BSU made the following "nonnegotiable" demands:

1. That all black studies courses being taught through various other departments be immediately made part of the Black Studies Department and that all the instructors in this department receive full-time pay.
2. That Dr. Nathan Hare, Chairman of the Black Studies Department, receive a full professorship and a comparable salary according to his qualifications.
3. That there be a Department of Black Studies which will grant a Bachelor's Degree in Black Studies; that the Black Studies Department, the chairman, faculty and staff have the sole power to hire faculty and control and determine the destiny of its department.
4. That all unused slots for Black students from Fall, 1968 under the Special Admissions Program be filled in Spring, 1969.
5. That all black students who wish to, be admitted in fall 1969.
6. That 20 full-time teaching positions be allocated to the department of black studies.
7. That Dr. Helen Bedesem be replaced from the position of Financial Aid Officer, and that a Black person be hired to direct it, that Third World people have the power to determine how it will be administered.
8. That no disciplinary action will be administered in any way to any students, workers, teachers, or administrators during and after the strike as a consequence of their participation in the strike.
9. That the California State College Trustees not be allowed to dissolve the Black programs on or off the San Francisco State College campus.
10. That George Murray maintain his teaching position on campus for the 1968–69 academic year.[60]

The Third World Liberation Front (TWLF), a coalition of nonblack student groups, made five additional demands two days later:

1. That schools of ethnic studies for the ethnic groups involved in the Third World be set up with the students in each particular ethnic organization having the authority and control of the hiring and retention of any faculty member, director and administrator, as well as the curriculum in a specific area study.
2. That 50 faculty positions be appropriated to the School of Ethnic Studies, 20 of which would be for the Black Studies Program.

3. That in the Spring Semester, the college fulfill its commitment to the non-white students in admitting those that apply.
4. That in the Fall of 1969, all applications of non-white students be accepted.
5. That George Murray, and any other faculty person chosen by non-white people as their teacher, be retained in their position.[61]

The Third World Strike revolved around three issues: the appointments of George Murray and Nathan Hare, minority enrollments, and the black studies/ethnic studies proposals. The contention around Murray's dismissal was easy to understand. He was a popular student leader who was also an instructor in the Tutorial Center and English Department. His ouster likely was seen as an attempt to squash a political dissident. It is also easy to see why students would have demanded larger black enrollments, given the fact that these enrollments were dropping throughout the 1960s.[62] It is easy to understand the demands for affirmative action, increased financial aid, and increased minority enrollments.

However, the demand for black studies requires more explanation because

Figure 3.4. George Murray (*right*) and Black Student Union activist Jack Alexis at the time of the Third World Strike. Murray's continuing presence at San Francisco State College and his anti–Vietnam War speeches were a problem for the college's administration. He was expelled in October 1968 and the Third World Strike coalition demanded his return to the campus. Courtesy of *San Francisco Chronicle*.

Figure 3.5. Nathan Hare at a black educators' conference at Stanford University in February 1968. He was hired to be the first black studies chair on February 1, 1968, but bureaucratic delays prevented the program from being established in the 1967–1968 academic year. The Third World Strike coalition demanded that the administration establish the Department of Black Studies and appoint Hare as its first chair. Courtesy of Nathan Hare.

existing records show that a black studies program already had been approved by the college administration in 1966. At no point was the administration opposed, in principle, to black studies, as later accounts suggest. Shortly after black students invented the idea of black studies in the Experimental College in 1966, administrators regularly met with students and talked about how to create a Black Studies Department. One government report notes that the Council of Academic Deans considered a Department of Black Studies as early as the fall of 1966. The next two years were spent developing the proposal and hiring a staff. In fact, the students' emphasis on black studies confused and angered some prostudent administrators. Vice President for Academic Affairs Donald Garrity issued a statement pointing out that black studies already had been approved by the college.[63] Not only Garrity but also Acting President Hayakawa supported black studies; even Ronald Reagan did so, though very reluctantly.[64]

The dispute over black studies arose because of the speed of its implementation and the deterioration of relations between the president's office and black students. Jimmy Garrett and other black students were frustrated by the college committees that slowed the black studies proposal in the 1967–1968 academic year. Although black studies was formally approved sometime in 1967 or even 1966 (existing records are unclear on the exact date) and a program chair, Nathan Hare, was hired, black studies remained in the Experimental College and in a handful of departments offering black studies courses. There were many reasons for this delay. In an interview, Nathan Hare informed me that administrators delayed the program by refusing to cooperate with him in completing the department's proposal. Administrators kept changing deadlines and the rules regarding the needed paperwork, and they insisted he needed a collaborator who was not provided.[65] Another issue was that the board of trustees refused to ask for the required money from the state legislature. Furthermore, some departments were unwilling to give up courses to a new Black Studies Department, and the university administration was tied down by conflicts with radical white students who were protesting against the Vietnam War.

The delays in creating a recognized black studies program erased any goodwill that black students may have had for administrators. Initially, relations between the burgeoning black student group and administrators were cordial. Willie Brown describes how John Summerskill, who was president during most of the 1967–1968 academic year, constantly talked to black student leaders. He describes Summerskill as a person willing to communicate with black students, even during very difficult times. Before the Third World Strike, Summerskill and Glenn Smith, assistant to the president, did much to make black studies a reality. Aside from providing their moral support, Summerskill and Smith approved hiring Nathan Hare, a University of Chicago Ph.D. in sociology and a professional boxer. Hare would be the first chair of the black studies program.[66]

Although the college administration supported black studies, protest soon undermined the administration's ability to act on behalf of black students. Turmoil sapped the deans and the college president of their resolve to act quickly in response to black students' proposals. Willie Brown, the future assembly speaker and San Francisco mayor and a BSU friend and lawyer, said, "Summerskill was literally being sabotaged, and that is what drove Summerskill out, not a lack of success. And the blacks, incidentally, did not drive Summerskill out. The radical whites ultimately were Summerskill's downfall . . . because they were demanding changes that were allegedly unpatriotic, and this brings the

Trustees down on you."[67] With a resistant faculty and the departure of a sympathetic president, black studies was not approved, and the proposal became a sore point at San Francisco State College in the spring of 1968. Campus disruption and bureaucratic delays prevented a sympathetic administration from carrying out promises to quickly implement black studies.

The Strike Escalates

The college administration responded predictably to the Third World Strike, which did little to end the conflict. College spokesmen insisted that under no conditions would the campus be closed. Regardless of what happened in negotiations with students, the administration was initially determined to keep classes going. The president's office issued a statement declaring that violence, property damage, and campus disruptions would not be condoned or tolerated. This reliance on routine actions did not prevent the strike from escalating and completely undermining President Robert Smith's authority.

Strike activities began the day after demands were issued to the president's office. The BSU/TWLF tactics were extensions and escalations of what had happened earlier. A common activity was for a small band of students of color to randomly select classrooms and ask instructors why they weren't honoring the strike. A few news reports claimed that instructors were threatened by these students. If the instructors continued to teach, enforcement squads would show up to make sure the class was canceled.

The BSU/TWLF staged a large rally on November 7. About five hundred students approached the administration building shouting for Murray's reinstatement. The administration used mild tactics to control the crowd. The campus police chief stood in front of the building and read a statement, which instructed the demonstrators to disperse. The police chief also informed the protesters that they would not be allowed to enter the administrative building. Following the statement, most protesters left, but a handful tried to enter the building. Campus police arrested two students. Upon inspecting their bags, the police found small bombs.[68]

The strike's first major turning point occurred on November 13, when students organized another massive rally that degenerated into a fight with campus police. Sometime in the morning, the San Francisco police department received a report that a cameraman had been beaten at the San Francisco State College campus by a black student. In response, the SFPD sent the city's tacti-

cal squad to the campus.[69] Upon their arrival, the cameraman convinced the police that he could identify the man who kicked and beat him. He also claimed that he filmed his attacker as he was running away.[70]

With that information, two plainclothes police walked toward the campus area where the BSU had set up headquarters. The headquarters was, at that point, one of the small huts used for various student government activities, such as the Tutorial Center program and the Experimental College. The huts were located in a cramped area between the student union and another academic building. When the plainclothes police and the cameraman arrived, the cameraman looked around and said he could not identify his attacker. In the meantime, the tactical squad lost radio contact with the two officers.

The tactical squad then walked into the area where the cameraman and the plainclothes police were. Students thought their presence was an attempt to intimidate them or possibly to attack them. Accounts differ, but eventually the police and students were embroiled in physical conflict, and BSU president Nesbitt Crutchfield was hurt badly by the police. The altercation escalated; soon hundreds of students and dozens of police were involved in a massive fight.

This is the moment during the strike when the administration first completely lost control of the campus. Vice President for Academic Affairs Donald Garrity recalled that he and Glenn Smith did not know that the tactical squad had chosen to confront the BSU students at their headquarters. They were eating lunch in the president's office when they received reports of the tactical squad's actions. Knowing that the police intrusion would immediately be seen as hostile, they realized that the situation could only grow worse: "The first thing we knew about it [the squad's march on the BSU hut] was when the officer we worked with—Inspector Ralph Brown, really a first rate guy—said, 'Gosh, the Tac squad is going into the BSU.' . . . There is the Tac unit, and black students with all their feelings about not only the police but the Tac unit. . . . They blew it, blew it right then and there. Flat-out mistake on the part of the police. With all the symbolism that's involved for black people and the like, in this movement."[71] From Garrity's perspective, the fight was a natural outcome of the situation. The students were suddenly faced with the commanding presence of the tactical squad, a unit specializing in riot control. The uniformed squad looked tougher and more menacing than the average police officer; armed with heavy jackets, plastic shields, and clubs, they were visually threatening. The students' responses, ranging from screaming to running away to storming the police, must have panicked the police as well. Intending to find

the plainclothes policemen, the tactical squad suddenly found themselves amid a charging mass of hundreds of students. They reacted violently.

The local and national press reported the fight. By the end of the day, more rallies were held on campus. One professor, William Stanton, charged that Smith was a fool for attempting to work within the system. He insisted that the campus be completely shut down: "There are no more classes at San Francisco State. . . . That man [President Smith] is a damned fool for trying to work within the system. The trustees must act to restore Murray, guarantee adequate funds for Black Studies and the Third World people, and make a clear declaration that the faculty will be free to run this college. They must tell us what they intend to do to restore justice on this campus."[72] The students organized another rally in front of the administration building. They screamed at President Smith when he tried to tell them that he had called the police in order to protect them. The students drowned him out.

At 5:25 p.m., on November 13, 1968, Robert Smith held a press conference announcing that it was no longer possible to safely carry out the college's basic instructional duties. Police assistance did not prevent violence. Smith announced, "We will keep the campus closed until we can run it on a more rational basis." With that, the college officially closed, and the BSU/TWLF achieved its first major victory.[73]

President Smith Resigns from Office

The campus closure was the beginning of the end of Robert Smith's presidency. His critics believed he had simply lost control of the campus. They saw the closure as surrender to crazed student protesters. Within days, politicians slammed Smith and his handling of the strike. Governor Ronald Reagan called the closure an "act of capitulation" and remarked that the administration itself had contributed to the riot. He claimed Smith had openly defied the chancellor's order to remove all violent elements within the campus. Reagan was not alone. He was joined by assembly speaker Jesse Unruh, his nemesis in the state legislature, who egged him on. Unruh sent a telegram to Reagan, saying, "You should not sit idly by as Governor and permit San Francisco State College to close its doors. Such a posture would constitute a triumph for anarchy."[74]

Smith tried his best to mediate the situation. He told a meeting of the faculty senate that he was not in a hurry to open the campus. He assured the eight hundred or so assembled professors that he would judge the safety situation

on a daily basis. At the same faculty meeting, the professors passed a proposal to give 11.3 full-time equivalent positions to a new black studies program. The senate also recommended to California state college system chancellor Glenn Dumke that Murray be reinstated as an instructor. Unsurprisingly, Dumke rejected the academic senate's recommendation.[75]

At the same meeting, S. I. Hayakawa made his first appearance as a figure in the crisis. Having taught English and linguistics since 1955, Hayakawa was a semanticist who wrote on stereotypes and political language. He also had a reputation in the Bay Area as a critic of student protesters. Hayakawa used the convocation as an opportunity to further this criticism. He stood up and emphatically urged Smith to keep the campus open. He started by attacking those who labeled every critic of "negro demands" a racist. He noted that black student disruptions were condoned by many white faculty members who had not condoned previous disturbances engineered by white students. According to Hayakawa, this was a double standard that black students ought to resent. He then turned to the issue of campus closure, framing it in terms of academic freedom and responsibility to emphasize faculty autonomy: "No one—no matter how great his need to establish his black consciousness—has the right to break into my classes and tell my students that they are dismissed. . . . When my classes are dismissed, I shall dismiss them. The conduct of my classes is my responsibility and not anyone else's and I shall continue to fight for the right to continue to do my duty."[76] Hayakawa then pushed, unsuccessfully, for student-faculty peacekeeping committees who would prevent classroom disruptions.

While the campus was closed, Smith met with student leaders, faculty members, and delegations from the California state college system. His goal was to assess the danger posed by future protests and develop methods for controlling unrest. During these meetings, Smith's position became untenable. He received direct orders from the state college chancellor to immediately open the campus. He was also urged by influential people to keep the campus closed. For example, in a board of trustees meeting, a representative of the college's nonacademic staff, technician William T. Insley, insisted that opening the campus would put him and the custodians in danger. In general, student and faculty leaders thought that a forced reopening would aggravate the situation.[77]

Commanded by the board of trustees to reopen the campus, Smith devised a compromise solution that he thought could satisfy both sides: he ordered a series of convocations, mass meetings where issues could be openly discussed. The convocation compromise left no one happy. The quasi opening of the cam-

pus was viewed by some faculty members as a signal that they could come back to campus and teach. BSU members were angry that some classes were being held, despite their formal cancellation. The professors' return undermined what the BSU/TWLF strike achieved. For the critics, the convocation was a de facto cancellation of classes. The public meetings with forums for BSU students served only to legitimize disruptive protesters.

The convocation provided an opportunity for acrimony between students and faculty. If the goal was to defuse tensions, the convocation was a failure. It started with BSU members demanding the power to open a Black Studies Department by establishing black control over the college curriculum. In the words of one student: "Our major objective is to seize power. Power must come to the people and black power will come to black people. As things now stand you must present your program to the pigs in power and they must approve it. Until we have power, everything else is bullshit."[78] BSU members and administrators spent the rest of the meeting going back and forth on racism and the fact that the trustees refused to cede anything to the protesters.

The meeting's failure was immediately apparent. Governor Reagan called the convocation a delaying tactic, which it was, and BSU members publicly called President Smith a "pig." On November 26, Smith was called to an executive session of a board of trustees meeting. When he was grilled in detail about his plans to open the campus, his answers did not satisfy the trustees. The meeting dragged on until Smith abruptly broke an awkward silence by saying, "Gentlemen, I'll save you a lot of effort here. I resign!"[79]

The Rise of S. I. Hayakawa

The collapse of Robert Smith's short-lived administration shows how the black student mobilization exploited the college's weaknesses. Without an effective discipline policy, it was impossible for Smith to quickly remove Murray from campus in the spring and fall of 1968. It was also impossible for college deans to quickly discipline insurgent students. Furthermore, the broader wave of protest, including the black protests at other California colleges, drained many administrators of the emotional resolve needed to engage with protesters. To further aggravate the situation, any public concession to students was quickly interpreted by California state political leaders as a capitulation to disorder. Protest from below and public censure from above converged in a vise-like grip that crushed the San Francisco college administration.

This situation changed after Smith's resignation. The board of trustees immediately appointed S. I. Hayakawa as acting president of San Francisco State College. Hayakawa, an English professor, had risen to prominence during the strike as an opponent of disorder. He led a failed attempt to organize professors against the students and wrote letters to the chancellor in an attempt to persuade him to force open the campus.[80] After Smith's unexpected resignation, the chancellor offered Hayakawa the acting presidency.[81] Hayakawa accepted.

The appointment drew severe criticism from faculty and students. Hayakawa came as a surprise choice to many at San Francisco State College. The main criticism was that the chancellor had circumvented the normal channels for appointing a college president. Technically untrue because Hayakawa was an acting president, the charge resonated among those who felt that the board of trustees continued to usurp the faculty's authority, but even Robert Smith admitted that his resignation made things hard for the board.

At first, it was not clear that Hayakawa would be any more successful than his predecessors. For example, he proved to be erratic and insensitive in his dealings with other faculty members and the press. Hayakawa seemed to be an extremely awkward and clumsy negotiator. Often, he was simply rude. During a meeting with BSU members and their allies, Hayakawa managed to alienate them and quickly squander the goodwill he might have had. Willie Brown, BSU attorney and future mayor, was at the meeting and recalls what happened:

> He is plantation-oriented in terms of his concept. He went to a black community meeting and said in effect that the majority of the people in the state desired to have the campus opened to black boys and girls, denounced the SDS. He said, "You be good boys and girls and help me on the campus and I will go back and tell all the white folks what you did and ask them to do something for you." Those were his exact words.
>
> At that point, I became the peacemaker. . . . I knew at that time Hayakawa's life was literally at stake. . . . But that is the kind of insult, the condescending attitude that Hayakawa displayed.[82]

Hayakawa's tone deafness sometimes came out in dealings with the press. He once left reporters utterly confused when he compared life at the college to his recent Hawaiian fishing trip. At another press conference, Hayakawa wore a Hawaiian lei and regaled reporters about the "reign of terror" on campus.[83] Popular accounts of the strike are rife with Hayakawa's infuriating comments.

To this day, Hayakawa is often remembered as an undiplomatic purveyor of conservative sentiment.

Other times, the new college president was remarkably savvy and could exploit the role of beleaguered "tough love" professor. He wore garishly colored clothes and at one point stood on top of a van arguing with protesters. These appearances garnered attention from the media, which he used to cultivate a positive public image. He was interviewed by newspapers, appeared on television, and once appeared before Congress to testify about student protest. Soon, Hayakawa grew into a conservative folk hero standing strong against hippies, an image he used during his political career as California senator in the 1970s.

In private, Hayakawa could be unusually accommodating. Observers testified that he was open and willing to listen to all sides of an argument, even to black students who riled him. Upon accepting his new position, Hayakawa secretly met with black students in a serious attempt to bring the strike to an end. Samuel Jackson, a labor arbitrator who visited the campus, described Hayakawa as completely accepting of outside help. Ironically, Jackson thought that maybe Hayakawa was spending too much time listening to him.[84]

In the end, Hayakawa had one resource his predecessors did not have: a good relationship with the board of trustees. He used his image as a tough critic to extract one concession from the trustees that Smith and Summerskill were unable to obtain, the opportunity to shut down the campus without fear of reprisal. Hayakawa closed the campus a week early in December 1968. Calling the closure a revision of the academic calendar, the trustees approved it as a measure needed to ensure the protection of life and property on campus. The two previous presidents had not obtained the trustees' permission to close the campus. Instead, the trustees ordered Smith, and Summerskill in winter 1968 in an unrelated protest, to keep the campus open. Hayakawa managed to close the campus without drawing ire from government leaders, a clear violation of precedent.

Guerilla War

The Black Student Union and its allies were waging guerilla war against the college administration. Students used Murray's suspension and the postponed Black Studies Department as an opportunity to seize power on a college campus. They wanted changes in the curriculum, the student body, and the author-

ity structure of an educational institution, and they were well prepared for the struggle. They already had an alternative curriculum and allies in the city and the press, and they were well versed in protest tactics. Enduring the dangers of various southern civil rights projects had made the BSU a battle-hardened group ready for action. The BSU was likely the most determined, tenacious, and well-organized student group that a major university administration ever had to fight.

The BSU's strategy was fairly straightforward: disrupt the campus through a combination of physical intimidation, bombings, and publicity campaigns. Physical intimidation included incidents such as the *Gater* beating, classroom disruptions, and yelling at students and administrators. Student leader Jimmy Garrett reveals in his interview that black students asserted themselves in student organizations by intimidating white student leaders. A common tactic was to have a dozen or more students stand behind white students while they were talking. This tactic continued throughout the strike. Bombings were also a crucial part of the campaign. Throughout the strike, nine bombs were set and four detonated on the San Francisco campus.[85] The bombs were rarely aimed at people. They often exploded in secluded areas in the early hours of the morning. One can surmise that the intention was to wear down an embattled college administration.

The strategy of petty harassment and public intimidation was called by some "the war of the flea" because it was a method used by the weak to gain power over the strong. Jimmy Garrett describes this tactic:

> Q. *This thing has been mentioned, the tactics of the flea. Does this ring a bell with you? Violence moving in and then moving out fast. Minor disorders, disruptive things. Move out fast so that by the time the authority comes there is nobody there.*
> A. That's the concept that was developed. It's called guerilla war.[86]

Hayakawa realized that students were engaged in a protracted battle. His earliest action, ending classes a week early, was intended to prevent campus violence by removing opportunities for protest and disruption. Although the tactic bought the administration some time, by December 3, Hayakawa had incensed protesters and there was another bloody confrontation between police and the BSU. The violence angered Hayakawa, who antagonized student protesters by standing on top of a van and screaming at them through a megaphone. The incident was photographed and became one of the enduring images

of the strike. The "van yelling" episode, also known as "the sound truck incident," illustrates Hayakawa's strengths and weaknesses as a college president. The image of a nebbish professor castigating unruly students proved popular in the press. Television stations were soon demanding interviews. But the incident also highlighted Hayakawa's temper. By his own admission, he had "blown his top" and unnecessarily angered students.[87]

The next day, with tensions heightened, students and police fought again after somebody threw rocks at the police. After arrests and injuries, Hayakawa and student leaders railed at each other. Strikers claimed "psychological and political victory," while Hayakawa declared his determination to "end this reign of terror." Life became more difficult as city leaders showed up on campus to mediate the strike. Some, like Willie Brown, thought Hayakawa was a poor choice for the presidency and said so in a speech on campus. Hayakawa tried to defuse the strike by making a "peace offering"—he offered a black studies program, 128 positions for minority students, and the creation of a special position within the financial aid office that would help "third world" students successfully apply for tuition assistance.[88] In the same speech, he said that the other demands—notably Murray's reinstatement—were being worked on. Student strikers took the most negative stance toward the proposed solution. A BSU leader said Hayakawa was offering "tidbits." A local minister said, "The movement is going forward, and we want the pigs to know it."

Hayakawa's other attempts to manage the crisis were unsuccessful. His "peace offerings" were not accepted. His attempts to control professors illustrate his weakness in the early phases of the conflict: although California state law gave him permission to fire teachers who did not show up for work, to do this he needed paperwork from department chairs, which was not forthcoming. Most notably, his attempts to dispel rallies were a failure; through the college spokesman, he issued orders to students that were often ignored.

Hayakawa's weakness in the fall of 1968 meant that the strike could continue into the winter and spring of 1969. The strike intensified once again in late January when students staged a mass rally that resulted in 457 arrests. This time, the incident was relatively orderly; students quietly let a small number of police arrest them without incident. The arrestees included Nathan Hare, who was supposed to have been the first black studies chair. The mass arrest horrified civic leaders. Mayor Alioto said the arrests were unjustified because there was no sign of violence. The strike continued throughout February and most of

March. Campus life continued between rallies, demonstrations, and occasional arrests. The campus reopened in the spring semester, and classes began to be taught, despite occasional bombings and fights with police.

The guerilla campaign took its toll on everyone involved. The disorder ended the presidential tenure of Robert Smith and made managing the college a daily ordeal for Hayakawa. The strike also had a physical effect on the college administration, students, and the city. The campus itself spent thousands of dollars, during a budget crisis, monitoring students and repairing damage inflicted by the bombing campaign. Students and police injured each other quite seriously in about a dozen violent confrontations. Injuries ranged from minor scratches to wounds requiring surgery. Students would often throw rocks and bottles at police. Although the police wore helmets and body armor, it was not enough to completely prevent injuries; a number of officers suffered broken bones. Students were frequently injured at protests. Internal police reports show students often were mildly injured while being dragged by police, but it was not uncommon for students to be more severely injured while fighting with police. Some required hospital treatment as a result of brutal fights and injuries sustained while in police custody.[89]

Among students, the strike elicited a wide range of responses. Of course, those associated with either the BSU or the TWLF always framed the strike in the most triumphant terms. No matter what happened, they interpreted the day's events as favorable for them. Arrests were seen as a sign that the college administration was desperate; a rally with no arrests was seen as equally successful. Other students had mixed feelings about the protest. Students typically sympathized with the strike's general goals but felt ambivalent about the radicalized groups who were running the strike. A black graduate student, for example, expressed a commonly held feeling that black studies was long overdue, that the trustees had aggravated the situation by refusing to implement the program.[90] This theme was often expressed by students interviewed by newspapers and various government agencies. Many students also felt that bombings and fights with the police were unnecessary and distracted from the university's real problems.

Civic leaders were often critical of the college administration and the board of trustees and cautiously supportive of the students. As the strike carried on, support for Hayakawa eroded among community leaders. One of the city's police commissioners, Washington Ganer, felt that Hayakawa was more interested in "playing to the establishment" than applying his knowledge of the sit-

uation to resolving the strike, an evaluation motivated by Hayakawa's clever use of the media. This sentiment was seconded by others who thought that Hayakawa cared deeply about the strike but was too sensitive to Reagan, the board of trustees, and the "white world." Of course, there were some who simply had no faith in Hayakawa because in all of his dealings, he refused to demonstrate any understanding of the problems from the black perspective. Ron Dellums reported that Hayakawa claimed to be the mediator between the black community and the white power structure. Dellums reported, "If that's not a 1950s liberal concept then I have never seen one."[91]

Hayakawa Defeats the BSU

Not surprisingly, the strike continued through February and March of 1969. Hayakawa could not end the strike through diplomacy alone, and he did not possess the power or formal authority to unilaterally end the conflict. At the very least, the brusque side of his personality prevented him from successfully conducting delicate negotiations with students, and the discipline policies meant that he possessed no credible threats. While these conditions might have completely debilitated others, Hayakawa seemed to relish his embattled position. Furthermore, his growing public image as a bulwark against campus radicals and his comfortable relationship with Reagan and the trustees gave him the safety needed for long-term strategizing.

In the early part of 1969, Hayakawa moved to strengthen his hand in the dispute. He wrote a new discipline code allowing him to try student protesters in absentia. Student disciplinary hearings would be run by faculty members chosen by him. The disciplinary code would allow him to quickly expel contentious students and thus ban them from campus, if needed. Hayakawa hired new assistants and advisers willing to implement the new tough disciplinary code. For example, he hired Edwin Duerr, a business professor, as coordinator for internal affairs. In an interview, Duerr stated his determination to crack down on a small group of "hard core" radical dissidents. Duerr also said that nonnegotiable demands were inherently unreasonable.[92]

Hayakawa expressed his determination to outlast the strikers in a February article in the student newspaper. "I can outwear the opposition. I'm doing the only possible thing I can do by showing that I'm not going to be intimidated by the attempted turmoil into yielding to educationally disastrous demands."[93] He said that the strikers were the real impediment to ending the strike. The key



Figure 3.6. San Francisco State College president S. I. Hayakawa (*left*) at a January 17, 1967, press conference with Governor Ronald Reagan. Hayakawa, who was unpopular on campus, used his ties with California political leaders and a tough public image to strengthen his hand in the dispute. As the Third World Strike continued, Hayakawa rewrote the school's disciplinary policies and appointed loyalists to crucial student discipline positions. By March 1969, Hayakawa had the power to threaten striking students with immediate expulsion and force an end to the conflict. Courtesy of *Sacramento Bee*.

issue was nonnegotiable demands and the unwillingness of the TWLF to work with the Ethnic Studies program approved by the faculty senate.

The college president repeated his position in the yearly State of the Campus address. Hayakawa's appearance drew the local media and some of the strikers. Upon arriving, a few black faculty members shouted at Hayakawa, and they were removed by the police. His speech was constantly interrupted by nearly simultaneous insults and praise. At one point in the speech, a group of five black students and faculty members, including Nathan Hare, marched toward the stage. Hare and Hayakawa then engaged in a screaming match about calling off the police. Hayakawa yelled, "The police won't be removed until you, Nathan Hare, leave. Nathan Hare, get out of here." About twenty pro-Hayakawa faculty members then stormed the stage. Police, waiting in the wings of the auditorium, rushed the stage and separated the two groups. They escorted the black contingent out of the building. Regaining his composure, Hayakawa continued

his speech. He accused strikers of opposing Hayakawa's standing offer for a Department of Black Studies just to have something to protest about.[94]

The week after Hayakawa's speech was the beginning of the end for the strike. The first break was the arrest of George Murray, the Black Panther and English instructor whose suspension started the strike. On January 24, 1968, Murray's car was pulled over by Palo Alto police for speeding. They found two loaded guns in Murray's car, a violation of his parole conditions.[95] In late February, Murray's probation was suspended by a San Francisco municipal court judge. Although students insisted that negotiations accommodate Murray's incarceration, the arrest made Murray's reinstatement a moot point. Further demands to free Murray went unheeded by the city and the college administration. Murray's jailing was unsuccessfully challenged in the California superior court.

A less noted, but crucial, moment was when the California state senate passed a number of bills giving college presidents more legal authority to unilaterally expel protesters from their campus.[96] Pushed by the board of trustees and its legislative allies, the bills gave the California college presidents a great deal of leeway in handling disciplinary problems. The state senate also passed a bill making it a felony to strike a campus police officer. These two bills made it very easy for a college president to terminate a protest by simply declaring that protesters were inciting others to violence. The police were obliged to remove them. Any resistance could easily lead to a felony conviction.

After these bills were passed and Murray had been arrested, Hayakawa formally terminated Nathan Hare's employment. Hare was originally hired to run the black studies program. When the program was not established, he remained as special curriculum adviser, a rank equivalent to associate professor, and joined the staff of the vice president for academic affairs.[97] At the end of February 1969, Hare received a "courtesy letter" informing him that his contract would not be renewed. When his status as a college faculty member was lost, Hare could easily be banned from the campus. At a press conference, Hare said he knew that "forces" would not let the strike come to an end until he was "dehired."[98] Unsurprisingly, Hare's assessment was correct. The two outstanding issues in the strike were Murray's reinstatement and Hare's appointment to the new Black Studies Department. With Murray in jail, Hare removed from the campus, and Hayakawa's new power to eject protesters, it was only a matter of time until the strike would come to its end, because Hayakawa *had already conceded* to every other BSU demand. There was literally nothing left to strike about.

Of course, students and faculty were still quite angry in March 1969. The strike did not automatically end. Many were willing to fight on. But there were signs within a week that the end was quite near. For example, students started attending classes again. The BSU organized an unsuccessful rally aimed at persuading students to honor the picket line. A few weeks earlier, Hayakawa successfully lured some faculty members back to work while prohibiting those arrested for strike activities from teaching.[99]

The final, decisive action in the strike was Hayakawa's suspension of the student newspaper, the *Daily Gater.* In the 1968–1969 school year, a new editorial staff ran the paper, and they were closely allied with the BSU/TWLF coalition. The editors in spring 1969 were constantly critical of the president and his new disciplinary policies. They used the paper as a tool for communicating with students, announcing the time and place of the next day's strike actions.

Hayakawa ordered that the newspaper stop printing on March 9, 1969. Presumably, Hayakawa's goal was to remove a tool for publicizing and coordinating protests. The paper's editorial staff found ways to keep publishing, but Hayakawa's tactic worked. The paper was only disrupted for about a week, but during that week Hayakawa negotiated a settlement to the strike. In exchange for amnesty, a committee of BSU and TWLF students agreed to what Hayakawa had offered in December: a black studies program, some affirmative action, and some extra financial aid for ethnic minority students.[100] Although a few student groups vowed to challenge the settlement, the strike ended, and the Black Studies Department would open in fall 1969. Soon thereafter, the college president successfully banned future rallies and ejected stalwart BSU/TWLF leaders. Hayakawa had won; the concessions accepted by students in March 1969 were identical to those he had offered in December 1968. George Murray never returned to San Francisco State College. Nathan Hare satisfied his remaining obligations by advising students and faculty in the spring and fall of 1969 on how to start the Department of Black Studies. Afterward, Nathan Hare left the academy and pursued a career as a writer, psychologist, and personal counselor.[101]

Institutions in Formation, Organizations in Conflict

The Third World Strike's complex story draws attention to important issues in the history of American higher education and the sociology of organizations. Historically, the Third World Strike shows how nationalist politics arrived at a college campus, which indirectly resulted in a new academic field. The account

of how an entrepreneurial Panther activist selected San Francisco State College is an insightful example of how nationalism in the 1960s impacted American colleges. Although few colleges experienced an episode as spectacular as the Third World Strike, black student groups at other campuses were often assisted or inspired by groups like the Black Panthers or SNCC. The Third World Strike is also interesting because it affected California politics of the day, giving politicians like Ronald Reagan and Jesse Unruh a chance to pursue a Nixonian "law and order" rhetorical strategy.[102]

This concluding section focuses on the strike's sociological implications. The mobilization at San Francisco is a stark example of how the factors identified in chapter 2 converged to create revolt. An organized black student population with contacts in newly formed nationalist groups developed a strong grievance identifying the college as racist. The BSU's growth into an impressive political group might be seen as the ideal culmination of this political process.

Aside from illustrating arguments from social movement theory, analysis of the strike yields lessons for organizational scholarship. One important observation is that black students did not develop the black studies proposal ex nihilo. The melding of nationalist ideologies with the college curriculum of the mid-1960s shows how activists create institutional alternatives by combining different elements from their organizational environment. Students created the black studies courses by infusing previously existing educational practices with new meanings. For example, the black studies curriculum of 1967–1968 had courses from the social sciences and humanities. It also included numerous courses in visual arts, music, and creative writing. The key difference in these courses is that they conveyed a broader vision of the unity and importance of black culture. Much of the black studies curriculum mimicked existing curricula. In addition to organizing courses into traditional areas such as the humanities, the black studies curriculum offered a writing sequence, which is a typical feature of most undergraduate degree programs.

The other interesting feature of the black studies proposal was how the Experimental College itself facilitated the development of black studies as a viable proposal for organizational change. It is true that the Experimental College allowed black students to try their hands at teaching, but the Experimental College's most valuable contribution was that it allowed black students to collect many courses into one academic unit. Although few recognized it at the time, the Experimental College allowed students to make demands that were symbolically important but relatively inexpensive for the college to carry out.

Without something like the Experimental College, students would have faced considerable difficulties in persuading departments, ranging from music to history, to provide resources for a yet nonexistent program. The Experimental College drastically reduced the cost of organizing a prototype program, which became a bargaining chip in negotiations with deans. Therefore, black students were in a relatively strong position. The student-run educational program allowed students to make the plausible argument that black studies already existed and needed just a little more support in the form of a chair, staff, and a few more courses. The Black Studies Department was ultimately created by augmenting the Experimental College courses with courses extracted from other departments. The development of the Department of Black Studies from the Experimental College courses shows the specific ways that organizations themselves provide resources that movements use to enact change. Activists reinterpret existing structures and then use the bureaucracy itself as an incubator and leverage point for social change.

The fight for Murray's reinstatement and for black studies shows that organizational scholars need to more fully consider how administrators themselves respond to insurgents. Currently, administrators have a relatively small role in theories of organizational crisis. A number of sociologists have viewed prison riots and revolts within schools, colleges, and prisons as "microrevolutions," which are organized attempts by an organization's clients to overthrow state-like authorities.[103] Originally developed by Jack Goldstone and Bert Useem to describe prison riots, microrevolution theory can be applied to any institution that is "client intensive," organizations where the "clients"—students, prisoners, military conscripts, and so on—are constantly under the control of administrators. Goldstone and Useem claim that a combination of five elements explains disorder within client-intensive institutions: external pressures on the organization, pressure from staff, pressure from clients, client ideologies that justify revolt, and unjust administrative actions.

Microrevolution theory captures much about the Third World Strike. George Murray's suspension was an "unjust" action that triggered the confrontation. There was also an "inmate" ideology—black cultural nationalism—that delegitimized the San Francisco State College curriculum, the college's disciplinary policy, and the administrators themselves. Although only briefly discussed in this book, there were also conflicts among professors, the staff, and the administration that would certainly count as pressures exerted by the institution's staff.

What is missing from microrevolution theory is an explanation of how organizational leaders struggle through the uncertainty generated by revolt. Goldstone and Useem do acknowledge that leaders can reestablish order by providing clear policies and creating solidarity with the institution's staff. However, as the Third World Strike demonstrates, leaders vary in their ability to do so. John Summerskill and Robert Smith were not able to use the college's resources to manage or adequately respond to student demonstrations. In both cases, their handling of crisis resulted in their resignations. In contrast, S. I. Hayakawa, who was loathed by many within the college and around San Francisco, was able to extract an agreement from the BSU/TWLF coalition to end the conflict. What was the difference?

Summerskill, Smith, and Hayakawa did not differ much in their specific policies, although each president approached the black student movement from radically different perspectives and had different goals. When it came to handling student demonstrators in the 1967–1968 school year and during the strike, all three college presidents publicly insisted on keeping the campus open but resorted to campus shutdowns when overwhelmed by demonstrators, and they were not averse to asking for police assistance in an emergency situation. All three agreed that George Murray's attack on the *Gater* staff was unacceptable, and all were committed, in principle, to having him disciplined and expelled, though Summerskill was inconsistent in his handling of the issue. It also bears noting that all three college presidents accepted demands for a black studies program.

The difference between Hayakawa and his predecessors was that he appreciated that the college was embedded in a larger political system. More so than earlier college presidents, Hayakawa understood the need for intensive impression management. He seemed to understand that not only did college presidents have internal political problems, they also had external problems. This is not to say that the other college presidents did not appreciate public relations. They issued press statements and negotiated with the board of trustees. But what Summerskill and Smith did not do was alleviate negative public opinion. Therefore, the ill will directed at the California colleges eventually rested on the shoulders of the college leadership. The governor and the assembly speaker did not feel any compunction about chastising the college leadership, in public or in private.

Hayakawa's solution to this problem was to use his image as a critic to insulate himself from attacks by state leaders and the public. Initially, Hayakawa's

reputation was limited to the Bay Area, where he was known as a Free Speech Movement critic. This was enough to garner the attention needed for his emergency appointment as acting president. Although he could be awkward and insulting, he also had a keen understanding of the media. By the winter of 1969, Hayakawa appeared regularly on radio shows and television. He also appeared before Congress. In the voluminous evidence that I reviewed on the strike, I found little to indicate that he was ever challenged by state political leaders. Polls conducted by news organizations indicated that he was wildly popular among the public.[104]

Of course, popularity does not equal efficacy. Hayakawa's antistudent attitudes may have endeared him to California politicians and the public, but he still had to create an effective strategy for fighting demonstrators. Hayakawa still had to solve the problem that destroyed Smith's presidency—how should the administration respond to students who established picket lines, disrupted classes, and set off bombs? Too much dependence on the police had triggered violent confrontations, as Robert Smith had found out in November 1968. Instead, Hayakawa tried to slowly change the rules of the game so he could exploit the opportunities presented to him.

Hayakawa did not passively accept the situation, and he experimented with different tactics until something worked: offering a compromise, opening and closing the campus, threatening students, meeting secretly with student leaders, writing new disciplinary rules, and hiring loyal lieutenants. Hayakawa's success depended on finding a balance of carrot and stick that undermined the ideology justifying the strike and the BSU's ability to sustain the strike and provided incentives for some of the strike leaders to come in from the cold. These sanctions and incentives brought order to the campus only when George Murray was sent to prison (on an unrelated issue, an event over which Hayakawa had no control) and Nathan Hare's contract with the university was not renewed. With Murray and Hare gone, the ideology legitimating the strike had no force. The incentives and sanctions could now be applied by the college president and his lieutenants. Only after Hare's and Murray's permanent departure could Hayakawa use his powers to suspend the student newspaper, disrupt communication among the students, and offer incentives to students to end the strike.

The theoretical point to be made is that Hayakawa actively worked in two different domains of action, cleverly moving between the media and the academy. Sometimes, he would make public appeals to reinforce his authority. He

used his formal position as a college president to procure media appearances, which protected him from political interference. Then, with the safety afforded by his increasing popularity, Hayakawa developed a new administrative repertoire for dealing with the strike coalition. The strategies for ending the strike proved successful only when events beyond Hayakawa's control—Murray's arrest and the expiration of Hare's contract—made it possible for him to act decisively.

The lesson for organizational theory is that the dissolution of authority provides opportunities for new leaders to arise and reclaim power but that leaders must have a fairly refined understanding of how that is to be accomplished. Leaders must balance competing demands for public accountability and internal order. It is true that the ability to wield power depends on external political pressures and internal dissent, as microrevolution theory claims, but it is also true that much more needs to be said about how leaders impose order inside the organization while they maintain legitimacy in the public domain. Hayakawa's handling of the Third World Strike shows that the ability to juggle these two competing demands, which might be termed administrative skill or competence, is crucial. The importance of social competence already has been explored by sociologists who have described how some actors are unusually skilled in understanding and manipulating their bureaucracy, an ability that sociologist Neil Fligstein calls "social skill."[105] According to Fligstein, humans operate in domains of action, such as politics or academia, that have their own specific rules and resources. Highly skilled social actors are those who understand the intricacies of their situation, such as the bureaucracy, and can further their interests through expert navigation of their environment.

Fligstein's conception of social skill is subtle enough to capture Hayakawa's savvy and constant experimentation. Social skill has different dimensions, such as the ability to understand organizational culture, frame proposals, and manipulate formal rules. Highly skilled actors also understand the informal practices and social ties within organizations. Hayakawa, a semanticist who specialized in the meaning of political language, certainly fits the description of the highly skilled social actor. His uncanny ability to convert public image into organizational authority shows his understanding of how the college bureaucracy related to the California political system and how he used this knowledge to his advantage.

The Third World Strike shows not only how black studies emerged from turbulent nationalist politics, but also how movements destabilize organiza-

tions and leaders assert power. Organizational scholars can learn a great deal about how movements generate alternatives and push for change, as well as how administrators work to channel or contain movements, from the interactions between black students and S. I. Hayakawa. Future research can more fully explore the kinds of situations that encourage organizational participants to create alternatives, like the black studies curriculum, and the effectiveness of various administrative responses.